Abstract. Simple stochastic exchange games are based on random allocation of finite resources. These games are Markov chains that can be studied either analytically or by Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, the equilibrium distribution can be derived either by direct diagonalization of the transition matrix, or using the detailed balance equation, or by Monte Carlo estimates. In this paper, these methods are introduced and applied to the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) game. The exact analysis shows that the statistical-mechanical analogies used in the previous literature have to be revised.
includes, as special cases, percolation, the Ising model, the voter model, and the contact model [1] .
In general, these models are Markov chains or continuous-time Markov processes. Therefore, there is a full set of mathematical tools to analyze them and compute the equilibrium distribution. In this paper, however, the focus is on conservative models, where the total number of agents, g, and the total size or wealth, n = g i=1 n i , are conserved by the dynamics.
John Angle has introduced the so-called One Parameter Inequality Process (OPIP) that can be defined as follows. Let us suppose that there are g players in a room, each of them with an initial amount of money, n i (0) = n/g. Two individuals are randomly selected to play against each other. They flip a coin and the winner gets a fixed fraction, ω, of the loser's money. Then the game is iterated. If j and k are the selected players at step t, their amount of money at step t + 1 is given by: n j (t + 1) = n j (t) + ωd(t + 1)n k (t) − ω(1 − d(t + 1))n j (t), and n k (t + 1) = n k (t) − ωd(t + 1)n k (t) + ω(1 − d(t + 1))n j (t), where d(t) is a Bernoullian random variable assuming the value 1 with probability 1/2 or the value 0 with probability 1/2. Angle has studied the equilibrium distribution for the OPIP by means of Monte Carlo simulations and analytical approximations [2, 3, 4] .
The Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) model described in [5, 6] and rediscovered in [7] is very similar to the OPIP, but there is an important difference. After the coin toss, the winner receives a fixed amount of money, d.
Indebtedness is impossible: Players reaching n i = 0 cannot lose money any more. If they are selected to play and they lose, they stay with no money, if they win, they get the fixed amount of money from the loser. On the contrary, in the OPIP, very poor agents always lose only a fraction of their money, and they never reach the situation n i = 0. In the OPIP, the variables n i are intrinsically continuous, whereas in the BDY model they can be considered discrete.
To summarize, the BDY game can be described as follows. Let us consider a system of g > 1 individuals (agents) who share n coins, n ≥ g. At each discrete time step two agents are chosen, and they toss a coin. At the end of the bet, the winner has one more coin and the loser has one coin less (d = 1 is assumed, without loss of generality). Agents' choice is random (i.e. each distinct couple has the same probability to be extracted) and each bet is fair. If the loser has no coins, then the move is forbidden and a new couple of players is extracted. An equivalent formulation of the game, avoiding forbidden moves, is the following. An agent is chosen randomly among all those having at least one coin, and this agent is declared to be the loser; the winner is chosen randomly among all agents. This paper will be devoted to an analysis of the BDY game. In section II, the basic random variables for the description of the game will be introduced. Section III will be devoted to the methods of solution and it is the core section of this paper. Finally, in section IV a critical discussion of the results will be presented. The reader will find further mathematical details in an appendix.
Random Variables
In the BDY game, as well as in similar exchange games, one has to allocate n coins among g agents. In the following, a random variable will be denoted by a capital letter:
A, whereas a will refer to a specific value or realization.
The most complete description of the game states is in terms of coin configurations: X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). Each random variable X i is associated to the ith−coin, and its range is the set of agents; for instance, X 7 = 3 denotes that the 7th−coin belongs to the 3rd−agent. The total number of configurations for n coins distributed among g agents is g
n . This can be called the coin description. The less complete description is in terms of coin occupancy numbers or partitions: Z = (Z 0 . . . Z n ), where
, that is the number (not the names or labels) of agents with h coins. This is the frequency distribution of agents, commonly referred to as wealth distribution; it is an event, not to be confused with a probability distribution. The constraints for Z are n 0 z i = g, n 0 iz i = n. For the BDY game, the number of agents without money, z 0 , is very important. Its complement is k = g − z 0 , the number of agents with at least one coin.
3 Methods of solution
An irreducible Markov chain
The dynamic mechanism of the BDY game is the hopping of a coin from one agent (the loser) to another (the winner). The natural description is in terms of agents, Y = (n 1 , . . . , n g ). Let us suppose that at given time, t, the agents are described by the state Y(t) = (n 1 , . . . , n g ) := n. At the next step, the possible values of Y(t + 1) are:
sponding to the a loss of the ith− agent and a win of the jth− one. The transition probability between these states is:
where the first term,
describes the random choice of the loser among the agents with at least one coin (n i > 0), and the second term,
, is the probability that the jth− agent is the winner. As also an agent with zero coins can be a winner, there are no absorbing states. Note that in eq.
(1) the assumption is made that coins necessarily change agent; if one admits that coins can come back to the loser, the second term simplifies to 1/g, the dynamics slightly changes, but the equilibrium distribution is not affected. Considering both the intuitive meaning of the game and the formal transition probability (1), the sequence
is a discrete-space and discrete-time
Markov process, i.e. a finite Markov chain; every state can be reached from any other state, the set of states is irreducible, and no periodicity is present. Hence, there exists an invariant probability distribution, and this distribution coincides with the equilibrium one. This means that
for all the n + g − 1 n possible occupation numbers.
Direct enumeration and Monte Carlo sampling
The direct enumeration method can be used to study the game when g and n are not too large. To illustrate the method, let us consider the case g = n = 3. The total num- 
The vector, π, giving the equilibrium probability distribution can be computed diagonalizing P, as its transpose, 
Exact solution
As the size of the state space is a rapidly growing function of n and g, the invariant distribution can be investigated via the detailed balance equation [8] .
Let us consider two consecutive states: (n 1 , .., n i , ..., n j , .., n g ) and (n 1 , .., n i − 1, ..., n j + 1, .., n g ), with the con-ditions n i > 0 and i = j . The direct flux is given by
the inverse flux is
The two fluxes are equal if
Hence the probability function:
is invariant, and it coincides with the equilibrium one.
Two remarks are useful. First of all, in eq. (2) π(n)
does not depend on the agent labels but is a function of the partition Z(n) to which the description Y = n belongs.
This implies that all the sequences Y = n ′ and Y = n are equiprobable, if n ′ and n belong to the same Z, that is if n ′ is any permutation of n. Therefore, the random variables (Y 1 , . . . , Y g ) are exchangeable [8] , and they are also equidistributed, once equilibrium has been reached and eq.
(2) holds. All n belonging to the same Z being equiprobable, one gets for the partition probability distribution:
Secondly, only those agent descriptions sharing the same number of agents without coins have the same probability. Indeed, the probability of a given occupation vector n depends on z 0 (n), and, thus, it is not uniform. The reader is invited to verify this property in the particular case g = n = 3 described in the previous subsection. Indeed, if π(n) were uniform in eq. (3), one would get the most probable value of z i by maximizing the multinomial prefactor subject to the constraints for Z. In the limit of large systems, the result is
. At the end of the next subsection, the limit n >> g >> 1 will be considered for the BDY game, where the exponential wealth distribution is recovered as an approximation to the exact solution.
The normalization constant C is computed in the Appendix, based on the method described in a paper by Hill [12] . It turns out that:
Eqs. (2), (3), together with the normalization (4), give the equilibrium distributions for the BDY game.
The average wealth distribution
The number of the agent descriptions, n, and of the partitions, Z, is very large for g and n large. Moreover, both π(n) and Π(z) are multidimensional distributions. In order to search for a quantity that can compared with ex-perimental observations, one can notice that agents are exchangeable and any probability distribution is symmetric with respect to the exchange of their labels. Empirical data are given in terms of the actual wealth distribution z. At any step, Z(t) = z(t) is just the actual wealth distribution. If equilibrium is reached, Π(z) represents the multivariate sampling distribution, and the vector E(z)
denotes the set of first moments of Π(z). It is useful to define the marginal average
Z continuously fluctuates around E(z). As a conse- E(z i ), the average wealth distribution, will coincide with the most probable value of Z (say z * ) for large systems.
As already noticed, if π(n) were uniform, then one could find the most probable value of Z, z * , by using Lagrange multipliers, and the functional form of z * would be exponential in the Stirling approximation.
In the BDY game, this is not the case. However, as a consequence of eq. (2), π(n) is uniform for all vectors with the same k = g − z 0 . The exact value of E(z i ) can be derived analyzing all the agent descriptions with the same k. Conditioned on k, one gets:
and the equilibrium probability of k is
Finally, using eqs. (4), (6) and (7), one gets
The proof of the above results can be found in the Appendix. Notice that the thermodynamic limit (n, g, k >> 1) of eq. (6) is
. Then, the average fraction of agents with at least one coin follows a geometric distribution that becomes exponential in the continuous limit. In this limit, the average wealth distribution, E(z i ), (or the most probable wealth distribution z * i ) is a mixture of exponential distributions with mixing measure given by eq. (7).
Considering eq. (7), one observes that
n+g , and
Therefore, in the case of minimum density, n = g, one has that P (k) is bell-shaped with flat maximum at k * = ng n+g and k * + 1, as
In the large density limit n >> g, the curve is left-skewed, the maximum is very close to g, as
i.e. g 2 < n, the maximum value is just k * = g. In the case of large density, the mixing probability distribution is concentrated on a small number of values of k, and, thus, if g >> 1 the behaviour is not very different from the single geometric It is interesting to remark that for small values of g the distribution is strongly dependent on g: it is uniform for g = 2, linear for g = 3, parabolic for for g = 4,. . ..
Except for the very peculiar case g = 2, the distribution is decreasing for i > 1, but in some cases E(z 0 ) < E(z 1 ).
The latter feature deserves further investigations. Fig.1 shows the case g = 3 and n = 3, whereas Fig.2 has again 3 agents, but 30 coins. Fig.3 is the logarithmic graph for g = 30 and n = 30 to illustrate the approach to an exponentialtype distribution for large values of the number of agents, g. Recently, parsimonious exchange games like the one studied in this paper have been challenged by a group of leading non-orthodox economists [13, 14] . These games have been introduced in order to explain the allocation of wealth in the presence of finite resources. In [13, 14] , they are considered unrealistic because they do not take into account the free will of agents to participate in an exchange, and they include only strictly conserved resources, without production. Incidentally, in games such as the OPIP or the BDY models, inequality is obtained by pure chance.
Rich agents have no specific individual merit. Based on their beliefs, some scholars could also dislike this feature.
Replies to the objections in [13, 14] have already appeared in two papers by Angle [15] and by McCauley [16] .
In particular, Angle presents various arguments in favour of parsimonious exchange games, including their ability to reproduce empirical facts [17] .
The present authors would also like to stress that, also thanks to simple exchange models, a new concept of equilibrium could find its way into Economics: namely Statistical equilibrium. Many stochastic models in Economics are Markov chains or Markov processes (see refs. [18, 19, 20] for recent examples) and the concepts developed in this paper apply to those cases. These ideas will be the subject of future papers on the role of statistical equilibrium in Economics. The reader can consult ref. [21] for an early discussion and refs. [16, 22] for a criticism on the relevance of thermodynamic equilibrium in Economics.
One of the main results of this paper is eq. (8), giving the so-called wealth distribution. As the agent descriptions are not equiprobable, previous statistical mechanical arguments have to be revised. In general, the wealth distribution is not exponential and it becomes exponential only in the appropriate limit of large density and large number of agents. It is interesting to study the rate of approach to equilibrium in the BDY model, but this will the subject of a future paper of this series. The next paper of the series, will be devoted to a set of simple exchange models for the redistribution of wealth that can be regarded as toy taxation mechanisms.
APPENDIX

The normalization constant
The total number of possible agent descriptions, n, is
and they can be classified in terms of the number of agents with at least one coin:
the number of agent descriptions with k fixed agents with at least one coin is given by all occupation numbers which allocate n − k coins to k agents, that is
while g k are the different ways to choose the k agents among the g available. Then
is the number of agent descriptions with k agents with at least one coin. Indeed, one has:
and this formula expresses the decomposition of all possible states in terms of their "support" k. The decomposition can be re-written as:
Turning to eq.(2), the sum on all states can be divided into a sum over k and a sum over n|k, that is:
which gives the desired normalization constant.
Derivation of equation (6)
The average number of agents whose occupation number is equal to i is
the last equality holding as the Y ′ s are equidistributed.
P (Y j = i), i = 0, 1, ..., n is the marginal equilibrium probability of the wealth of the jth−agent, and it is the same for all j's. It is necessary to study the marginal distribution of an agent associated to the agent description probability (2) and to the partition probability (3), both holding at equilibrium. In order to derive formula (6), one needs
the marginal wealth distribution of an agent conditioned to k = g − z 0 . One knows from (2) that all agent descriptions Y = n := (Y 1 = n 1 , ..., Y g = n g ) with the same k are equiprobable, and their number is
Then P (Y 1 = n 1 |k) := P (Y = i|k) is equal to the number of Y ′ s such that g − 1 agents share n − i coins divided by W (k, g, n). The calculation can be divided into three parts. First, let us consider P (Y = 0|k); one has:
then, let us consider P (Y = i|k) with k ≥ 2, and i > 0; as there are k − 1 agents left with at least one coin, one has:
finally, for k = 1, one gets: P (Y = i|k = 1) = δi,n g , for i > 0, as in this case all coins are concentrated on a single agent. Eventually, by determining E(z i |k), one obtains eq. ing him to refs. [15] and [16] , respectively. This work has been partially supported by MIUR project "Dinamica di altissima frequenza nei mercati finanziari".
